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Rónán Ó Fathaigh 
 
The recent Article 10 judgment in Mouvement Raëlien Suisse v. 
Switzerland merits some close attention given the important 
questions of principle which are arguably involved. The First 
Section of the European Court found no violation of freedom of 
expression where Swiss authorities had banned a poster campaign 
by a quasi-religious association.  
 
The applicant association was the Swiss branch of the Raëlien 
Movement, an international association whose members believe 
life on earth was created by extraterrestrials. The applicant 
association sought to conduct a poster campaign, with the poster 
featuring extraterrestrials, flying saucers, and the words “The 
message from the extraterrestrials. At last, science is replacing 
religion”. The poster also included the website address of the 
Raëlien Movement.  
 
The police authorities refused permission for the poster campaign on the grounds of public order 
and morals, and the domestic courts upheld this decision. The Swiss courts held that although the 
poster itself was not objectionable, because the Raëlien website address was included, the Courts 
had to have regard to documents published on the Raëlien website. The courts held the poster 
campaign should be banned on the basis that: (a) there was a link on the website to a company 
which provided cloning services; (b) the association advocated “geniocracy” i.e. government by 
those with a higher intelligence; and (c) there had been allegations of sexual offences against 
some members of the association.  
 
The applicant association made an application to the European Court arguing that the ban on its 
poster campaign was a violation of its right to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the 
European Convention. 
 
At the outset, the Court stated that the case raised a novel issue which had not been considered 
before by the Court, namely whether the domestic authorities should allow the applicant 
association disseminate its ideas through an advertising campaign by making the “domaine 
public” available.   
 
Importantly, the Court held that the domestic authorities have a wide margin of appreciation 
where the authorities wish to regulate the use of the “domaine public”, accepting the 
Government’s argument that allowing the poster campaign might have implied that it endorsed 
or tolerated the views of the Raëlien Movement.  
 
Moreover, the Court reasoned that because the Raëlien website was available to minors, the 
impact of the posters was greater, and thus there was an increased state-interest in banning the 
poster campaign.  
 The Court then approved the carefully reasoned (“soigneusement motivé”) decisions of the Swiss 
courts. The reasons given were relevant and sufficient, with the Court finding it legitimate to 
have regard to the Raëlien Movement’s views on cloning, and finding the allegations of sexual 
offences disturbing.    
 
Finally, the Court held that the ban was a proportionate limitation on the right to freedom of 
expression, as the ban was limited to the “domaine public”, and other means of communicating 
were available to the Raëlien Movement. Thus, the Court concluded that there had been no 
violation of Article 10.  
 
Comment 
 
While some may dismiss the Raëlien Mouvement as farcical, or even dangerous, these views 
must not cloud the assessment of the principles involved in this judgment. It involves how the 
Court will assess interferences with speech in the public space, and four short points must be 
made: 
 
Firstly, the Court perceived the question before it as novel in nature; however, it curiously 
distinguished an earlier judgment from the Second Section in Women on Waves v. Portugal 
which held that where a ship had been banned from Portuguese waters where it was intended to 
engage in the dissemination of pro-abortion information in a Portuguese port was a violation of 
Article 10. However, the Court in Raëlien described Women on Waves as concerning a different 
matter, namely the use of the “espace public et ouvert” (para. 50). This is questionable, given 
that postering in public places and holding pro-abortion workshops in a port would seem to be 
analogous.  
  
Secondly, the most fundamental criticism that may be levelled at the First Section involves its 
conclusion that the domestic authorities enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in regulating the 
“domaine public” on the basis that the city authority did not want to create the inference that it 
supported or tolerated the views of the Raëlien Movement. This is an arguably dangerous 
proposition to accept: it allows domestic authorities greater discretion to prohibit speech in the 
public space because it disagrees with the content of the speech or the views of the speaker, as 
opposed to content-neutral considerations such as space or aesthetics; and could be applied to 
political groups wishing to use the public space.     
 
Thirdly, the consequent wide margin of appreciation allowed the First Section to hold that the 
reasons given by the Swiss courts were relevant and sufficient, referring to cloning, geniocracy, 
and allegations of sexual offences. There was nothing illegal in advocating cloning or 
geniocracy, and could be regarded as protected opinions on matters of public interest (Lingens v. 
Austria, para. 38), and additionally the allegations of sex offences were just that, allegations. It 
must be emphasised that the Raëlien Movement was not a banned organisation, nor had it 
violated any law.  
 
Finally, the Court failed to apply the principle that Article 10 not only protects the substance of 
the ideas and information expressed, but also the form in which they are conveyed (Thoma v. 
Luxembourg, para. 45).  
 
Notably, Judge Rozakis (President of the First Section at the time of the judgment), and Judge 
Vajić (current President of the First Section), dissented, holding a violation of Article 10. Given 
the importance of the principles relating to regulation of speech in the public space, there is a 
strong argument for this judgment to be referred to the Grand Chamber.   
 
For the sake of completeness, it is interesting to note that the German Federal Constitutional 
Court last week issued its judgment in the Fraport Airport case which held that a ban on 
entering an airport to distribute leaflets was a violation of the right to freedom of expression. The 
airport was deemed a public space (see summary by Prof. Dirk Voorhoof, Ghent University, 
here).  
 
 
 
 
